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Abstract 
 
Opportunity Zones:  
Mobilizing Private Capital for Public Good 
 
Jaclyn Hien Le, MPAff / MBA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  Martin J. Luby 
 
Opportunity Zones are a provision of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act aimed at 
incentivizing private investment in economically distressed communities across the United 
States. By offering tax incentives to investors, the federal government hopes to tap into a 
market of over $6 trillion in unrealized capital gains to benefit urban and rural 
communities. This program has the potential to be a win-win for everyone: investors 
receive significant tax breaks, communities benefit from investments, and the government 
helps to attract more capital than it could itself provide to these areas. The challenge is in 
implementation, which has skewed towards flexibility for investors and fund managers 
with little to no accountability or guarantee of benefit for communities. 
 This report examines how Opportunity Zones relate to and build on a history of 
funding economic development through tax expenditures and place-based policies. 
Interviews with economic development staff in city- and county-level institutions reveal 
how urban and rural communities across Texas are responding to and taking advantage of 
the Opportunity Zone program. While larger cities are adopting a variety of approaches to 
 vi 
developing their Opportunity Zones, small and rural communities are struggling to attract 
attention from investors. The purpose of this report is to analyze how Opportunity Zones 
fit into a broader context of economic development in the U.S., identify potential benefits 
and challenges of the program, and highlight early strategies adopted by both urban and 
rural Texas communities.   
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 1 
Introduction 
The 115th United States Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) in 
December 2017. Though the primary focus of the legislation was on individual and 
corporate income taxes, a lesser known provision called Opportunity Zones (OZs) slipped 
through the landmark tax bill. OZs are a federal tax incentive designed to attract private 
capital to low-income communities in need of reinvestment and revitalization. As the first 
federal economic development initiative passed in over a decade, OZs are significant for 
their renewed attention on place-based development and for their potential to unlock 
billions in private capital for low-income communities with the greatest need. 
To incent investment, OZs offer a variety of tax benefits in order to mitigate risks 
for investors supporting development and economic growth in communities that typically 
do not have access to stable financial capital. According to the Economic Innovation Group 
(EIG), a bipartisan policy and advocacy group focused on economic growth in the U.S., 
OZs offer three primary benefits to investors: 1) a temporary tax deferral on capital gains 
invested in an Opportunity Fund that makes equity investments in designated low-income 
communities, 2) a step-up in basis on the original investment in Opportunity Funds held 
for five or seven years, and 3) exclusion from capital gains tax liability for new Opportunity 
Fund investments held for 10 or more years (EIG, 2019). There is no limit on the amount 
of capital gains that can be invested in an Opportunity Fund. In 2018, EIG estimated over 
$6 trillion in unrealized individual and corporate capital gains that could be eligible for 
investment in OZs (EIG, 2018a). For investors with unrealized capital gains who are 
willing to make long-term investments, OZs offer incentives to move that capital into 
investments benefitting distressed communities while also receiving significant tax breaks 
on existing and future capital gains.  
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Which communities stand to benefit from Opportunity Fund investments?  Over 
8700 low-income Census tracts across all states and U.S. territories, including Puerto Rico, 
were officially designated as Opportunity Zones in 2018. The definition of low-income 
community comes from Section 45D(e) of the U.S. tax code first created for regulations on 
New Market Tax Credits in 2000. Eligibility as a low-income community requires that a 
Census tract have at least a 20% poverty rate or a median family income that is 80% or less 
than the median family income of the state or surrounding metropolitan area (New Market 
Tax Credits, 2000). While the tax incentive is offered at the federal level, the process for 
designating OZs was left to governors, who had broad authority to select OZs in their 
communities based on any criteria beyond poverty rate. In the spring of 2018, all governors 
submitted 25% of their states’ eligible low-income Census tracts to the Department of 
Treasury and IRS for approval as OZs.  
Because the TCJA provided governors with flexibility in OZ designations, there 
was a wide variety of approaches and criteria used to select OZs across the states. Some 
states such as Colorado and California underwent rigorous processes to forecast 
demographic and economic changes, to seek public input on high-need Census tracts, and 
to identify criteria by which designations would be made (CA Opportunity Zones & 
Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade). Other states chose 
their OZs via a less structured or less transparent process. The Office of the Texas Governor 
selected 628 Census tracts across the state based on “chronic unemployment, natural 
disasters within the last two years, and low population density” (Perlmeter, 2018). In 
interviews conducted for this report, some Texas city officials stated that they sent 
recommendations of areas in their jurisdiction to the governor’s office for designation, 
while other city officials became aware of OZs after the governor selected Census tracts in 
their communities. In theory, OZs can be a flexible tool for local and state officials to 
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leverage towards meeting their communities’ needs and catalyzing economic growth 
aligned to their strategic priorities; however, the ability of OZs to incentivize development 
in distressed communities first depended on the ability of states to identify and select areas 
most in need rather than communities already experiencing growth and development. 
Analyses of the 8700 OZs selected across the U.S. indicate that, on average, the 
chosen areas demonstrated greater levels of distress than the required minimum poverty 
levels. Gelfond and Looney (2018) of the Brookings Institution found that the average 
poverty rate in selected OZs was 29%, though there was more variation in the extent to 
which states selected their highest need communities for OZ designation. EIG (2018b) 
found that OZs are home to over 31 million people, 24 million jobs, and 1.6 million 
businesses.  Along several other dimensions, including employment growth, availability of 
development sites, and median family income, the selected OZs demonstrated a level of 
distress greater than communities not chosen (EIG, 2018b). In Texas, Governor Abbott 
designated 628 OZs across the state, though many areas were concentrated in East Texas 
and in parts of the state most affected by Hurricane Harvey in 2017. The average poverty 
rate in Texas OZs is 28%, and over 60% of Texas OZs are partially or fully rural (Perlmeter, 
2018). Overall, these demographics and economic indicators show that, on average, OZs 
selected across the country and in Texas exhibit high levels of need and economic 
challenges. To meet the federal government’s policy goals and intention for OZs, states 
first needed to identify areas with true distress and need for economic development. By 
selecting distressed communities, governors set the table for investments in areas with 
significant need for reinvestment and renewal.  
However, designation as an OZ does not guarantee deal flow or investment dollars. 
As a market-driven incentive, OZs will only work if investors can identify investments that 
will generate economic benefit and favorable returns. Some communities, particularly 
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those in growing metropolitan areas, already have social, economic, and demographic 
factors that attract the attention of investors, developers, and businesses. Other 
communities will need to be more proactive in attracting private capital and offering 
potential projects ready for development. Strategies used to leverage OZ benefits will differ 
between urban and rural communities. Though OZs are a federal economic development 
initiative, local communities are critical to the success or failure of this program.  
RESEARCH SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
The purpose of this report is to contextualize OZs within a broader narrative of 
economic development in the United States and to highlight different OZ strategies across 
communities in Texas. The first chapter reviews the use of tax incentives, such as the New 
Markets Tax Credit, to drive economic and community development in the United States. 
Next, the report examines past federal economic development programs such as Enterprise 
Zones, Empowerment Zones, and Renewal Communities to identify ways that past 
experience can inform current OZ implementation. Finally, this report details the potential 
benefits and challenges of OZs and highlights how Texas communities are making use of 
OZ benefits for their residents and areas in need. Information in this report is based on 
interviews with city- and county-level economic development officials, community 
development groups, and OZ thought leaders. While the personal identities of those 
interviewed will remain anonymous, the communities that they represent include: Austin, 
Brownsville, Dallas, Houston, Lubbock, Orange, San Antonio, Texarkana, and Tyler.  
 5 
Chapter 1: The Use of Tax Incentives in Economic Development 
Though the tax benefits offered by OZs are significant, the use of tax incentives to 
mobilize private capital in low-income communities is not novel. Due to declining public 
investment in public goods and infrastructure at all levels of government, tax incentives 
are one avenue by which the public sector attracts private investment in communities.1 Tax 
expenditures, including specific types of tax credits, providing benefits to particular 
taxpayers offer an indirect way to invest in projects and goods that provide some level of 
economic boost to businesses and communities. The New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) is 
one example of a federal tax expenditure focused on revitalizing low-income communities 
across the country. Evaluations of the effectiveness of NMTC show mixed results in the 
social and economic outcomes generated by tax incentives. As OZ stakeholders look 
forward, it is important to consider the extent to which tax benefits can catalyze the growth 
and change that distressed communities truly need.  
DECLINING PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES 
In a resource-limited environment, public sector actors may seek to collaborate with 
or leverage private sector capital to maximize investments in public goods and 
communities. Public sector investments in infrastructure and public goods occur at the 
federal, state, and local levels. At the federal level, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
defines federal investment as spending in “physical capital, education, and research and 
development [that] boosts private-sector productivity gradually” (Congressional Budget 
                                               
1 It is important to note that the federal government offers many types of tax incentives and exemptions that 
are categorized as tax expenditures. For example, investors can receive exemptions from federal taxes on 
interests derived from investments in municipal bonds, many of which support local infrastructure or 
economic development projects. Investor returns are based on the government’s ability to repay the bond. 
While also considered a tax expenditure, OZs or NMTCs are different in that investors become equity 
owners of projects, and their returns are based on the success of those projects.  
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Office, 2016). By improving the quality of public goods such as transportation and 
increasing training within our workforce, the federal government supports the growth of 
private sector businesses and economic return for the country. Most of this investment is 
done through the federal government’s discretionary spending, which represents about 
30% of the federal government’s overall budget (National Priorities Project). The majority 
of the federal budget goes towards mandatory spending items such as Social Security and 
Medicare. Given how little of the federal budget goes towards discretionary spending, 
deciding what investments to make can be a political and contentious process.  
Over half of the federal government’s discretionary spending goes towards military 
and defense spending, leaving much less of the budget available for investments in physical 
infrastructure and education/workforce initiatives (National Priorities Project). In 2012, the 
CBO estimated that the federal government spent $531 billion on investments (including 
physical infrastructure and education), which is equivalent to 15% of all federal spending 
(CBO, 2013). Compared to other national priorities, investment in the types of projects and 
initiatives with a direct impact on business growth and day-to-day life of Americans is 
relatively small. The challenge is that the small share of federal spending on investments 
continues to decline. Non-defense discretionary spending in 1970 amounted to 2.5% of 
GDP, but has since declined to 0.5% of GDP in 2014 (Malinovskaya & Wessel, 2017). 
Investments in physical infrastructure as well as education and training are central to the 
long-term growth and productivity in the U.S. economy. Yet, the federal government 
spends less on public investments as a share of GDP today than it did over 40 years ago.  
Furthermore, spending on infrastructure also decreased at the state and local level 
in the same timeframe (Malinovskaya & Wessel, 2017). In the absence of federal spending 
on infrastructure and other nondefense items, states can improve the quality of their roads, 
education systems, and other assets by increasing their own level of funding. Again, public 
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investments directly and indirectly lead to more jobs, better quality of living, and economic 
growth. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities notes that most states chose to cut taxes 
rather than increase their level of investment in infrastructure needs at the same time that 
the federal government decreased its own investments in public infrastructure (McNichol, 
2019). The decline in state-level investment in infrastructure not only threatens future 
innovation and growth but also leaves current infrastructure in need of significant repair. 
While investment in infrastructure varies by state, overall investment in critical physical 
assets and workforce training limit economic growth across the public and private sectors.  
FUNDING PUBLIC GOODS THROUGH TAX EXPENDITURES 
Though direct government spending on infrastructure has declined, the public 
sector is able to indirectly support growth by offering tax credits and tax exemptions to key 
groups of stakeholders in order to facilitate economic growth. The Tax Policy Center at the 
Urban Institute and the Brookings Institution defines tax expenditures as “special 
provisions of the tax code such as exclusions, deductions, deferrals, credits, and tax rates 
that benefit specific activities or groups of taxpayers” (Tax Policy Center). These 
provisions can be made to create favorable economic gains and breaks for key groups of 
people or political constituencies; however, tax expenditures are also a way for the 
government to subsidize important activities or stakeholders that may contribute positively 
to the economy or public infrastructure. Tax expenditures offer an indirect way for the 
government to support certain groups, projects, or programs rather than providing direct 
funding itself (Tax Policy Center). Groups receiving preferential treatment can be as broad 
as taxpayers with children or as narrow as renovators of qualified historical buildings. 
There are many types of tax expenditures, including credits, deferrals, exclusions, and 
deductions. The capital gains tax deferral and exclusion offered to investors in Opportunity 
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Zones are an example of tax expenditures from the government. Supporters of tax 
expenditures believe that they offer local and state officials with greater flexibility in 
targeting investments towards community priorities and accounting for local context in 
implementation. Direct investments from the federal government may become too 
bureaucratic and too dependent on political support to sustain long-term projects. By 
providing more autonomy to local and state officials, tax expenditures allow for more 
diversity in projects supported and less administrative burdens in implementation.  
However, tax expenditures are not universally supported. Many believe that the 
federal government forgoes an excessive amount of potential tax revenue by offering tax 
expenditures to special groups of taxpayers. According to the Center on Budget and Public 
Policy Priorities (2018), all tax expenditures cost the federal government more than its 
entire discretionary funding budget, reducing federal income tax revenue by $1.5 trillion 
each year. Tax expenditures exist because the federal government believes that providing 
benefits to taxpayers or projects fulfills some kind of priority for the government; however, 
the cost of tax expenditures to the government is so great that it begs the question whether 
the government could directly fund or support its own priorities if it did not give up so 
much in tax revenue each year. Those who believe that the private sector can better fund 
policy priorities may think that tax expenditures are a way to be more efficient with limited 
resources. Opponents to tax expenditures often argue that these special benefits accrue to 
wealthier taxpayers in higher income brackets with the top fifth of the income bracket 
receiving 61.9% of individual income tax expenditures (Center on Budget and Public 
Policy Priorities, 2018).  The disproportionate preferential treatment for higher income 
taxpayers means that the government not only misses out on significant tax revenue but 
also does not support the low-income or middle-class taxpayers that need the most support.  
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Interestingly, the federal government offers several tax credits aimed at supporting 
and revitalizing low-income communities. The credits are geared towards investors who 
are willing to fund projects and support businesses in low-income, low capital communities 
that are typically considered risky for investments. One example is the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) created in 1986 to incentivize real estate developers to create 
affordable housing (26 U.S. Code § 42). The Historic Tax Credit (also known as the 
Rehabilitation Credit) created in 1966 subsidizes renovation of historic buildings, which 
many developers can use to make the revitalization of old buildings in distressed areas 
more economically attractive (26 U.S. Code § 47). Aligned closely with the policy goals 
of OZs, the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) was created in 2000 to incentivize private 
sector investment in distressed communities. NMTC and OZs both recognize a need for 
increased private capital in areas that typically have difficulty attracting investments 
needed to boost economic growth and job creation for those most in need. Recently, 
President Trump’s economic advisers, Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross, hinted at a more 
specific tax credit for infrastructure investment by private investors, but a formal proposal 
has not been released (Babbage, 2017). These credits are aimed at incentivizing the private 
sector to rebuild and reinvest in communities that have been left behind.  
Compared to other tax expenditures, these tax credits aimed at economic 
development in distressed communities are far from the costliest tax expenditures offered 
by the federal government (Novogradac, 2017). The largest federal tax expenditures are a 
tax inclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance ($172.8 billion between 2017-
2021), reduced tax rates on long-term capital gains ($127 billion), and a tax credit for 
children and other dependents ($121.7 billion) (Tax Policy Center). In comparison, the 
LIHTC is expected to cost about $45 billion in the same time period while the NMTC will 
cost about $6 billion (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2018). Overall, these community 
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development tax expenditures are a relatively inexpensive and indirect way for the 
government to support investments in infrastructure and programs needed to support 
economic growth in communities where development is most difficult.  
A COMPARISON OF NEW MARKETS TAX CREDITS AND OZS 
Though the tax benefits offered by the New Markets Tax Credit are not the same 
as those available in OZs, the two programs share similar policy goals of incentivizing 
private investment in low-income communities. NMTC was created in 2000 by Congress 
to incentivize investment from corporate entities and financial institutions in communities 
typically unable to attract investment for key economic development programs or 
infrastructure. Evaluations of NMTC found mixed outcomes of effectiveness in 
revitalizing distressed areas; however, this data can inform OZ implementation in similar 
communities in need of private investment.  
Before reviewing evaluations of NMTC, it is important to understand how the 
program is similar to or different from OZs. Congress created NMTC because it recognized 
a need to attract private investment, especially in the face of declining public investment, 
in low-income communities considered unattractive or risky areas for investors to support. 
In an era of increasing partisanship, it is noteworthy that both programs enjoy widespread 
bipartisan support. To make investing in low-income communities more feasible, NMTC 
offers investors a tax credit equivalent to up to 39% of the project value over a 7-year 
period towards their federal income tax (Tax Policy Center). The definition of a low-
income community under NMTC is the same definition used for OZs: 20% poverty rate 
within a Census tract or no more than 80% of the median income of the surrounding 
metropolitan area. Investors hoping to receive NMTC or OZ benefits are required to make 
equity investments in low-income communities. In essence, NMTC and OZs share a goal 
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of revitalizing a similar set of distressed communities across the country by incentivizing 
private investment. 
The biggest difference between NMTC and OZs is the level of funding and 
administration provided by the federal government towards implementation of NMTC. 
NMTC is a federal program centrally administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
and the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, which allocates a 
limited amount of tax credits each year among local Community Development Entities 
(CDEs) acting as intermediaries between private investors and local businesses. CDEs 
must apply for tax credits from the CDFI Fund through a competitive application process 
with criteria such as the extent of distress in a community and how much of a business’ 
revenue and workforce comes from the low-income community (U.S. Bank). The presence 
of CDEs as a local intermediary with an understanding of local conditions and community 
needs is a differentiating factor between the NMTC and OZ programs. While private 
investors make equity investments in the CDE, the CDE is ultimately responsible for 
providing loans or equity investments to businesses in low-income communities. They 
direct where the funding goes, which community priorities are supported, and track the 
results of NMTC-incentivized funding in their communities. Furthermore, obtaining 
certification as a CDE is a rigorous process with standardized requirements and approval 
by the CDFI Fund, which looks for organizations that share its goal of promoting 
community development and economic growth in the nation’s most distressed 
neighborhoods. CDEs must be governed by an advisory board with at least 20% of its 
membership from the low-income community that it serves (Federal Register, 2001). The 
NMTC program also requires extensive reporting and accountability measures to track 
what projects are supported, who benefits from these projects, and what outcomes result 
from the investment.  
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At the time of publication of this report, implementation of OZs is still in a nascent 
phase. Many investors, developers, community agencies, and local governments are 
awaiting final guidance and regulations from the IRS about OZs.  However, what the 
regulations have laid out in the first 16 months of the program indicates that the level of 
oversight from the federal government over OZ implementation will be minimal. To invest 
in low-income communities, investors must make investments into an Opportunity Fund, 
which then supports projects in a designated OZ. Any entity can fill out a 2-page form 
(Form 8996) to self-certify as a Qualified Opportunity Fund, which does not require IRS 
approval to begin making investments in OZs (Internal Revenue Service, 2018). Investors 
and developers seeking to unlock OZ benefits must source their own projects, but do not 
need to work with a local intermediary or organization to better understand community 
needs. For communities in less attractive markets (such as many rural areas), the lack of a 
local intermediary can be a hindrance to development because investors may not be aware 
of potential projects or do not have access to deal flow put together by entities with more 
knowledge of local conditions.  For communities in attractive markets, investors and 
developers are likely to already be aware of projects and may be able to bypass community 
development organizations hoping to attract investment for specific projects or community 
priorities. As of April 2019, the IRS does not require any reporting on investments made 
in OZs, though they are seeking public input on potential reporting requirements for their 
third round of OZ regulations.  
Comparing the implementation of NMTC and OZs (thus far), it is clear that NMTC 
is administered as a program of the federal government with resources for administration, 
accountability, and evaluation. Thus far, OZs, which fall under the purview of the IRS, 
have minimal requirements and ways to ensure that investments made in low-income 
communities actually result in the kinds of development needed in distressed areas such as 
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job creation, growth of small businesses, and social or healthcare facilities. As of spring 
2019, the IRS is soliciting public input on reporting requirements that can help evaluate 
what OF investments are made and what community benefits result from the OZ program. 
REVIEWING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NMTC 
Since implementation of OZs is still unfolding, it is too early to measure any signs 
of effectiveness towards fulfilling the program’s policy goals of revitalizing low-income 
communities. Given similar goals and intended outcomes of NMTC, reviewing evaluations 
of the NMTC program can identify potential challenges and highlight best practices in 
community development for OZ implementation. 
According to the CDFI Fund, CDEs raised over $48 billion in private investments 
between 2002 and 2018 to support over 5900 businesses in “severely distressed” 
communities across all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico (CDFI Fund, 
2018b). A wide variety of projects have been financed by NMTC ranging from real estate 
developments to alternative energy programs and small business development.  
Furthermore, the CDFI Fund estimates that over 750,000 jobs have been created through 
NMTC programs and initiatives since 2003 (CDFI Fund, 2018a). On the overall impact of 
the NMTC program, the CDFI Fund (2018a) states: 
 
For every $1 invested by the Federal government, the NMTC Program generates 
over $8 of private investment. The NMTC Program catalyzes investment where it’s 
needed most – nearly 75 percent of New Markets Tax Credit investments have been 
made in highly distressed areas. These are communities with low median incomes 
and high rates of unemployment, and the NMTC investments can have a dramatic 
positive impact. (p. 2) 
 While a significant amount of investment has gone towards distressed 
communities, the evidence of both community and economic impact is less clear. A 
metanalysis of several economic development incentives aimed at attracting private sector 
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businesses found that most incentives have no, or at best, marginal effects on investments, 
job creation, or community revitalization (Peters & Fisher, 2004). Local and state 
governments often offer significant amounts of tax benefits to firms in the hopes that these 
additional incentives will attract new businesses, catalyze additional investment, and create 
new jobs. In reality, tax incentives alone are often not enough to pull businesses to a 
location, as businesses tend to consider a broader set of issues including state corporate tax 
rates, local tax rates, and the quality of public services in a community (Peters & Fisher, 
2004; see also Rainey & McNamara, 2002; Harger et al., 2019). Though the metareview 
focused on a variety of incentives, including tax credits, the results across multiple studies 
indicate that these benefits for businesses are not enough to create the transformational 
change that economically distressed communities need. 
 Evaluations of the NMTC program show similar findings. Though the NMTC 
program intends to catalyze significant private sector investment and create lasting 
community outcomes, many studies show that there are positive benefits to NMTC, but not 
at the level expected by policymakers and community development advocates. Overall, 
there is evidence to show that the NMTC program does result in increased investments in 
low-income communities, though there is unclear evidence as to whether this is because of 
the relocation of investments from some communities to others, or if this the result of an 
overall increase in investment (Harger & Ross, 2016; see also Abravanel et al., 2013; 
Gurley-Calvez et al., 2009). Some studies show that NMTC do not generate significant and 
long-term effects on the overall well-being of residents because they are a “shallow 
subsidy” that can decrease some of the risk for investors in distressed communities, but is 
ultimately not enough to substantially change investor behavior (Gurley-Calvez et al., 
2009; see also Peters & Fisher, 2004; Rainey & McNamara, 2002). NMTC may shift 
investments from other low-income communities to those eligible for the tax benefits, but 
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there may not be an overall increase in the amount of investment by corporate or individual 
investors (Hula & Jordan, 2018). NMTC sweeten deals that likely would happen with or 
without the tax incentive. Gurley-Calvez et al. (2009) find that corporations investing in 
distressed communities do so because of other motivations, such as compliance 
requirements with the Community Reinvestment Act, while individuals invest because of 
philanthropic motivations, not a desire to pursue great economic return.  
 One possible explanation for investor behavior is the short timeline required to 
unlock the full benefits of the tax credits. Hula & Jordan (2018) suggest that investors 
choose projects that would happen with or without the incentives because they can only 
receive the NTMC if a project closes within 12 months; therefore, investing in projects that 
require a longer development timeline is economically unattractive. Tapping into an 
existing pipeline of projects that have been identified and are ready for development is 
easier than going through a long process to engage stakeholders, identify community 
priorities, and develop projects that may have more significant impact in the long-term. To 
expedite deal closings, investors often bring potential projects to CDEs for approval rather 
than CDEs identifying community projects for investments (Hula & Jordan, 2018). This is 
the antithesis of the intended implementation of NMTC, which must go through local CDE 
intermediaries that have knowledge of community needs and act in the interest of low-
income residents.  
 Furthermore, studies have shown that NMTC do not generate significant 
community impact, as measured by decreased poverty rates, increased job creation, or 
increased median income levels. Freeman (2012) finds that for every $1 million in NMTC 
investments, median household incomes increase 0.02% and unemployment falls by less 
than 0.1%. Given the magnitude of social and economic challenges in NMTC-eligible 
communities, this return on investment is insufficient to revitalize communities in a 
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meaningful way. NMTC investments can result in some benefits to communities such as a 
small increase in median home values; however, positive changes result from changes in 
the resident population rather than improved quality of life for current community members 
(Freeman, 2012). The evidence is unclear if NMTC investments contribute to some level 
of displacement, attracting new residents who tend to be wealthier than those that they 
replace, or if the program generates positive benefits for existing residents. Hula & Jordan 
(2018) find that NMTC investments can create new jobs, but many of these jobs are 
associated with the construction of real estate projects, making them temporary additions 
to the community. Economically distressed areas with high unemployment rates need job 
creation, but they need jobs that provide sustainable employment and wages to residents of 
the community.  
 Even though the NMTC funnels a significant amount of capital into economically 
distressed communities, the community impact of said investments is limited. Most of 
these investments go to projects that would be funded regardless of the tax incentive. Small 
improvements in community outcomes are often the result of new residents moving into 
the area, not a marked improvement in the lives of low-income people residing in the 
community prior to the investments. Severely distressed communities face a myriad of 
challenges that may be too great for a tax incentive to solve on its own. While these credits 
can sweeten deals for private investors, they are not enough to create the level of 
transformational change needed to revitalize distressed areas of our country. This raises an 
important question about the purpose and effectiveness of subsidizing economic 
development at all, especially if tax incentives tend to support projects likely to proceed 
with or without government support.      
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IMPLICATIONS FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
What lessons can the NMTC program offer for OZ implementation? Though the 
programs offer different tax incentives to private investors, they share a common policy 
goal of revitalizing low-income communities. Those interested in OZs should look to the 
NMTC program for both best practices and warning signs: 
• Government resources for program implementation: Achieving lofty goals of 
revitalizing distressed communities and creating meaningful impact for low-income 
residents does not happen by accident. The NMTC program demonstrates that 
administrative infrastructure is important for implementation of complicated tax and 
legal incentives. Combining central administration at the CDFI Fund and local CDE 
intermediaries with on-the-ground knowledge is vital to tracking program outcomes, 
providing technical assistance to potential investors, and ensuring that projects address 
community needs. Early guidance from the IRS on OZs suggests that the administration 
intends to adopt a minimal approach to implementation, jeopardizing the long-term 
success of OZs. Lack of clarity and support from the IRS makes it difficult for local 
governments to prepare for investments and makes investors more hesitant to invest 
without a clear understanding of how this works (Browning, 2019).  The federal 
government’s reluctance to put more substantive resources behind program 
implementation and tracking jeopardizes the ability of OZs to work for investors and 
communities alike. 
• Local community intermediaries: Unlike NMTC, OZs offer no formal role or authority 
for any local or state entities in implementation. Local governments, economic 
development corporations, or community development corporations have no way to 
track or monitor investments flowing into their communities. Investors can make 
significant investments in OZs without any coordination with local entities. Proponents 
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of OZs believe that a lean approach to implementation may ease the flow of capital into 
communities without administrative hurdles; however, offering local stakeholders no 
formal role in implementation makes it easier for investors to bypass community needs 
to invest in projects purely for economic return.  Rather than view local engagement as 
a barrier to investment, OZ supporters should think of coordination with local entities 
as a way to help mitigate risks and to anticipate development challenges.  
• Unintended consequences of expedited timelines: Both the NMTC and OZ programs 
require investments to flow to local projects within a quick timeline. Once NMTC 
investors are made into a CDE, these funds must be distributed to a qualified project 
within 12 months. As stated before, this timeline incentivizes investors and developers 
to select projects already in the pipeline or easier to close than investments that require 
a longer planning process (Hula & Jordan, 2018). The timeline for OZs is even shorter. 
OZ investors have 180 days to reinvest capital gains realized by the sale of their 
investment(s) into an Opportunity Fund, which then must invest in projects within six 
months (Novogradac, 2019). While this in itself may not be a big issue, investors must 
invest in an Opportunity Fund by the end of 2019 to qualify for the full benefits of the 
OZ program. As of spring 2019, the IRS released two tranches of regulations and is 
expected to release at least another tranche in the future. If investors want to access the 
full suite of OZ tax benefits, then they will most likely need to decide if and where to 
invest soon, which may curtail the time available to explore investment opportunities, 
conduct due diligence, and make investments. Coupled with the continued lack of 
clarity from IRS guidance, this short timeline to identify potential deals, raise funds, 
and distribute the funds to qualified projects likely dampens the level of investments in 
low-income communities. Aligning all of these pieces and stakeholders take time, and 
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the current runway provided for OZ investments does not set up investors or local 
communities for mutually beneficial success.  
• Need for a broader economic development strategy: Finally, the evidence of mixed to 
no meaningful outcomes from tax incentives indicates that tax incentives alone are not 
enough to revitalize distressed communities. While tax credits, exemptions, or deferrals 
can sweeten the deal for some investors, they are not enough to significantly alter 
investor behavior or the level of investment made in low-income communities (Peters 
& Fisher, 2004). It will likely take a broader, integrated economic development 
strategy, of which tax incentives are one tool, to make meaningful change in 
economically distressed communities. Tax incentives are not a panacea. Investors will 
require more than tax breaks to attract them to distressed communities, and local 
economic development officials will need to layer several incentives and strategies to 
move the needle on social and economic outcomes in these areas. While programs such 
as OZs are important, they are one tool for incentivizing economic development but 
unlikely to be a silver bullet for economically distressed communities.  
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Chapter 2: History of Place-Based Economic Development in the U.S. 
 Another trend in community revitalization and economic development is a focus 
on place-based initiatives. Instead of targeting social and economic supports to a group of 
people, many federal economic development initiatives focus on a limited set of 
communities and deploy a variety of incentives and investments to revitalize the 
geographic area. These communities can be defined by Census tract, neighborhoods, or 
even entire cities. Place-based revitalization efforts allow federal, state, and local 
governments to layer different incentives, attracting both significant public and private 
investments to address community needs in an integrated manner. Since the 1990s, the U.S. 
government has focused on target, place-based economic development strategies. OZs are 
the latest iteration of place-based development in the U.S. offering many similar incentives 
as past programs. This chapter focuses on the history of recent place-based development 
programs and the lessons they offer for OZs.  
ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES AND EMPOWERMENT ZONES 
 Authorized by the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993, the Enterprise 
Communities (ECs) and Empowerment Zones (EZs) were created to incentivize 
development in both urban and rural distressed communities across the country. According 
to a review of the programs by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2010, the 
programs “offered a mix of grants and tax incentives for community and economic 
development” to meet the goals of “revitalizing high-poverty, economically distressed 
communities” (GAO, 2010). The programs were created at the same time to address the 
same policy goals, but they differ in the mix of government grants and tax incentives 
offered to investors and local communities. It is important to note that the government 
intentionally designated both urban and rural areas through a competitive application 
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process through which communities submitted strategic plans for fostering economic 
growth and reducing poverty and unemployment.  
 Though the U.S. first developed a place-based approach to community 
development in 1993, the idea originated in the UK the 1970s and 1980s under Margaret 
Thatcher’s premiership to incentivize capital investments in former industrial areas and 
communities (Gunther & Leathers, 1987). The concept championed free market principles 
and removed government tax barriers and regulations to allow for more private investments 
in inner city neighborhoods. Decreased government regulations, increased free market 
activities, and more flexibility for local control in economic development made its way 
across the pond as several states enacted their own Enterprise Zone programs (Bondonio 
& Engberg, 2000). Because the principle behind Enterprise Zones focuses on locally-
driven, market-based development, states and cities have maximum flexibility to focus on 
their priority areas and to incentivize developments towards fulfilling local needs. At the 
same time, the Reagan administration focused on a smaller role for government in 
community development in favor of market-driven incentives and approaches. Eventually 
the proliferation of state Enterprise Zones and the shift to market-driven economic 
development led to the passage of a federal EZ program in 1993. 
  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 created both the EZ and EC 
programs, which share a policy goal of revitalizing economically distressed areas but differ 
in the types and amounts of incentives offered to investors and local governments. EZs 
offered broad incentives, including tax credits to businesses employing local residents, 
deductions for capital investments made by businesses, bonds with low or no interest rates 
for construction, and capital gains deferral and exclusion incentives for investors (GAO, 
2010). Congress also authorized over $720 million under the Social Services Block Grant 
to support residents of EZs and over $210 million in Community Development Block 
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Grants for the first round of designated EZs (Congressional Research Service, 2011). The 
combination of block grants and tax incentives was meant to infuse a significant amount 
of resources in high-need communities to spur economic growth and to improve the lives 
of residents. 
 Similar to the Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Communities (ECs) also offered a 
variety of grant and tax incentives to spur development in distressed communities. The key 
differences in the programs were the amount of resources authorized and the types of 
incentives offered. ECs provided credits for employment of youth in local communities, 
low interest bonds for construction, and block grants from the federal government (GAO, 
2010). Because ECs were smaller than EZs, the amount of grants authorized to support 
ECs was also smaller with $280 million in Social Services Block Grants and $88 million 
in Community Development Block Grants (Congressional Research Service, 2011).  
 Four federal agencies were responsible for joint administration of the programs 
with HUD managing the urban communities, USDA managing rural communities, HHS 
overseeing block grant funds, and IRS administering tax benefits (GAO, 2010). To be 
eligible for federal support, local governments and states could nominated areas for 
designation based on poverty, unemployment, and population size. Through a competitive 
application process, the four federal agencies evaluated local and state strategic plans with 
Secretary of HUD making the final selection of EZs and ECs. The first round of 
designations resulted in the selection of six urban EZs (Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, 
Detroit, New York City, and Philadelphia/Camden), three rural EZs (Kentucky Highlands, 
Mid-Delta Mississippi, and the Rio Grande Valley in Texas), 65 urban ECs, and 30 rural 
ECs (Congressional Research Service, 2011). Over the course of the programs, three 
rounds of designations were made between 1994 and 2000, resulting in 45 EZs and 115 
ECs receiving community development benefits and incentives.    
 23 
RENEWAL COMMUNITIES 
 Like EZs and ECs, Renewal Communities (RCs) were created in 2010 through the 
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act to revitalize economically distressed areas. 
Designations of RCs were made through a competitive application process similar to the 
one used for EZs and ECs using criteria around poverty, unemployment, and population. 
One difference in the designation processes used among these programs was that applicants 
for RC designation did not have to submit a comprehensive strategic plan. Instead, they 
provided federal agencies with a “course of action” with key activities that the community 
would take to address social and economic needs in the area (GAO, 2010). Table 1 shows 
the differences in program eligibility between EZs, ECs, and RCs by urban and rural areas 
as well as designation round. There was only one round of RC designation, resulting in the 
selection of 28 urban RCs and 12 rural RCs.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Program Eligibility Requirements for EZs, ECs, and RCs. Source: Government 
Accountability Office, 2010.  
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 Unlike previous federal economic development programs, RCs offered a limited 
set of tax incentives and no federal block grants. The tax benefits provided by RCs included 
wage credits for employment of local residents, tax deductions for building rehabilitation 
and capital investments, exclusion of capital gains for assets held over five years, and other 
investment incentives (GAO, 2010).  Administration of the RC program was much leaner 
than that of EZs and ECs because there was only one round of designations and only tax 
incentives were overseen by the IRS. Though EZs and ECs focused on broad elements of 
community development, RCs were more narrowly focused on supporting small to 
medium-sized projects through construction and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure 
(GAO, 2010). Table 2 shows the differences in tax benefits among the three different 
programs, though it is important to note that EZs and ECs received significant grant 
funding not captured in the table. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Tax Incentives Offered Through EZs, ECs, and RCs. Source: Government 
Accountability Office, 2010. 
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PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT 
How effective were these programs in achieving their policy goals? Studies from 
both the Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research Service found 
mixed results. Evaluations of EZ, EC, and RC programs find little to no significant 
evidence of improved economic conditions as a result of the grant funding and tax 
incentives offered by the programs (Congressional Research Service, 2011). Some studies 
show that these programs have led to small reductions in poverty level and unemployment; 
however, these changes cannot be attributed to the EZ, EC, or RC programs alone (GAO, 
2010). There is some evidence that designation as an EZ can increase property values in 
an area, which makes sense if EZs were designated, in part, due to infrastructure and 
community development assets that could help spur economic growth (Hanson, 2009). 
However, the same study shows mixed results on the effects of EZs on the employment 
and poverty rate of residents. Designated communities, some of which are quite large and 
complex, are affected by numerous factors which can influence economic growth or 
community change. Given the magnitude of challenges in many of these communities, 
several disparate components under one program may not be comprehensive enough to 
create substantive change in community economic conditions. 
Other explanations of the lack of detectable effectiveness include challenges in 
separating true program effects from broader economic changes (Congressional Research 
Service, 2011). Communities experience economic growth or decline due to changes in the 
condition of the national economy writ large. In a good economy, communities can 
experience economic growth based on factors unrelated to the grant or tax incentives 
provided by these federal programs. It is difficult to pinpoint whether these communities 
would have experienced growth and improvement on their own or whether the programs 
catalyzed the change. Alternatively, some studies have shown that improvements in social 
 26 
and economic conditions are the result of a change in the local population, not substantive 
improvement because of federal programs (Government Accountability Office, 2006). 
Reynolds & Rohlin (2015) found that EZs did not lift households out of poverty and that 
any improvements in income levels was more likely due to wealthier individuals moving 
into gentrifying communities, not a substantial improvement in the lives of those who were 
already in poverty. Displacement of low-income residents and an influx of wealthier 
residents can make it seem like the programs led to significant economic growth, but this 
could be interpreted as a failure of the program to achieve its goals of revitalizing 
economically distressed areas while also lifting up current residents.  
Though evaluations of EZ, EC, and RC programs at a national level indicate mixed 
results, some research points to small improvements on a local level. Rich & Stoker (2010) 
found that unemployment, poverty, job creation, housing investment, and business 
investment between six different EZ cities improved or worsened at different levels. This 
suggests that local context and policies can play an important role in the overall 
effectiveness of economic development programs. Variation in program implementation, 
including who is responsible for administering federal programs at the local level can make 
a difference in outcomes. For example, Chicago and Philadelphia implemented EZ 
incentives through existing city agencies while Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, and NYC 
created separate nonprofits to oversee the EZ program (Rich & Stoker, 2010). This suggests 
that it may be too simplistic to rely on national-level evaluations of large-scale federal 
economic development programs, especially when local context and policies is crucial to 
how programs are implemented.  
Results from evaluations of the EZ/EC/RC programs mirror many of the findings 
from evaluations of the NMTC program.  As stated in Chapter 1, it takes more than 
marginal tax credits to incentivize investments in low-income communities from private 
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investors, who are risk averse and profit driven. Between 1993 and 2009, Congress 
appropriated $1.78 billion in grant funding for EZs and ECs along with extensive tax 
credits across all three programs (Congressional Research Service, 2011). Mixed and 
inconclusive results about the effectiveness of these programs in improving communities 
is partially due to the fact that little data, if any, were collected by federal agencies on the 
use of program funds or any other monitoring requirements (GAO, 2006). The GAO 
repeatedly cites the lack of data collected through the duration of the programs as a major 
hindrance to the ability to evaluate whether and what kinds of impact the programs may 
have had on the country’s most distressed communities. The inability to measure or to 
attribute positive results to the federal programs begs the question: is this the most effective 
and efficient use of limited government resources?  
COMPARISON TO OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
 OZs are the latest evolution of a series of place-based federal economic 
development programs. Though the programs began with greater government oversight 
and funding, subsequent rounds of EZ/EC designations and the RC program stripped away 
grant funding in favor of tax incentives for private investors and businesses. OZs are an 
extension of that trend, as they offer only capital gains tax benefits to attract private 
investors to economically distressed communities. It is important to recognize similarities 
and differences between OZs and past federal programs. 
 Like its predecessors, OZs were created to revitalize economically distressed 
communities across the country. OZs focus on incentivizing private investments through 
tax benefits, including capital gains deferrals and exclusions. Similar incentives have been 
offered through the EZ, EC, and RC programs with mixed success. OZs are based on 
principles for local control and market-driven enterprise. Proponents of OZs state that local 
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stakeholders have maximum flexibility to design and implement programs that address 
their unique community needs. Furthermore, market-driven incentives ensure that only 
communities able to attract investors and to provide some level of economic return will be 
successful in leveraging OZs for community benefit. At its core, OZs are like all previous 
federal programs in its policy goal of focusing on communities that have been left behind 
in economic growth and community development. OZs also adopt several core tenets that 
characterized some past programs: local flexibility, incentives for private capital, and 
market-driven program structure instead of government administered.  
However, OZs are also different from past programs in key ways. Compared to 
previous federal programs, OZs offer a very narrow set of tax benefits to potential investors 
and developers. EZ/EC/RC investors received a broader set of tax benefits to employ local 
residents, fund construction projects at lower cost, and provide tax deferrals or exclusions 
for capital gains (GAO, 2010). In comparison, OZs are narrow in scope as they only offer 
capital gains tax deferral and exclusion benefits. OZ benefits accrue directly to investors 
and developers whereas past programs offered social services and assistance to improve 
the lives of residents. The level of program administration for OZs also differs significantly 
from that of past programs. Federal, state, and local governments have very little formal 
authority (if any) over the OZ program, which is administered through the IRS. From what 
interested parties have seen in the early stages of OZs, the IRS intends to keep its oversight 
of OZs to a minimum and are only responsible for OZs because of tax implications. If 
EZ/EC/RC were programs, then OZs are more of a tax incentive than a federal program.  
Finally, the scope of these programs differs dramatically. Over the course of 10 
years, a few hundred communities were designated as EZs, ECs, or RCs. Because OZs 
defines communities by Census tracts, there are over 8700 OZs ready for investment. This 
increases the market-driven aspect of the program, as some communities will attract 
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investments and others will not. Past federal programs guaranteed that all communities 
designated as EZs, ECs, or RCs will receive some kind of grant and/or tax funding, but this 
is not the case for OZs. Being designated as OZs does not guarantee that any amount of 
money will actually flow into the communities and improve the lives of residents. There 
will be competition among OZs to attract investors, who have a lot more options about 
where they would like to invest their money.  
On the other hand, one could argue that the EZ/EC/RC programs focused on too 
large of an area to be effective. As the program evaluations from the GAO (2010) and 
Congressional Research Service (2011) indicate, changes in the economic conditions of 
these zones could not be attributed to these federal programs alone. Perhaps the OZ 
program’s focus on Census tracts rather than neighborhoods or entire cities may increase 
the likelihood of success, as it could allow for more targeted investment opportunities. It 
is difficult to predict which is the better approach, but future evaluation of the OZ program 
(as well as more research on past economic development programs) can help identify best 
practices and challenges in implementing these types of place-based policies. 
 30 
Chapter 3: A Deep Dive into Opportunity Zones Benefits & Challenges 
 Understanding the broader community development context in which OZs fit is 
important to anticipating how OZs might unfold throughout the course of the program. As 
of spring 2019, OZs are still in an early stage of implementation. While there is a lot more 
to be learned about OZs, the program has generated significant interest and excitement 
among investors, developers, and community development advocates. This chapter 
highlights the key benefits that make OZs a noteworthy moment in this country’s economic 
development efforts as well as outlines the challenges that may limit the program’s abilities 
to deliver on its long-term policy goal. 
ORIGIN OF THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE IDEA 
 The creation of the federal OZ program was cemented in the passage of the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) in December 2017; however, the origins of the OZ idea began 
long before it became known to most people interested in economic and community 
development. As stated in Chapter 2, OZs build on many previous concepts in place-based 
economic development policies over the last several decades. Perhaps what makes OZs 
different is that this is an investor-led, market-driven approach to revitalizing the country’s 
most economically distressed communities. As such, the origin of the idea and the 
advocacy taken to ensure its passage relied heavily on private actors who built bipartisan 
support for OZs over time. 
 Those familiar with OZs often rely on resources from the Economic Innovation 
Group (EIG), a bipartisan research and advocacy organization, responsible for 
championing OZs. EIG was founded in 2013 by Sean Parker, former founder of Napster, 
John Lettieri, a government affairs professional, and Steve Glickman, former Senior 
Economic Adviser to President Obama. The group was founded to develop research and 
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advocate for public policies that addressed economic inequality in the United States. EIG 
developed a paper titled “Unlocking Private Capital to Facilitate Economic Growth in 
Distressed Areas,” which became the basis for the OZ idea. The paper argues that recovery 
after the Great Recession occurred relatively quickly in some areas while others continued 
to languish with high rates of poverty and unemployment (Bernstein & Hassett, 2015). 
Parker, who served as the founding president of Facebook, realized that many wealthy 
investors (including himself) were sitting on millions and billions in unrealized capital 
gains. Low-income communities need capital to jumpstart their economies and revitalize 
their communities. So, one of EIG’s early projects was figuring out how to pair these 
wealthy individuals with the kinds of equity investments that distressed communities 
needed. The paper analyzed past federal economic development programs including EZs, 
ECs, RCs, and NMTCs, stating that past programs suffered from too much complexity, 
burdensome government restrictions, and weak incentives (Bernstein & Hassett, 2015). 
Given past weaknesses, Bernstein & Hassett proposed a new program allowing investors 
to more easily pool their investments and utilize their unrealized capital gains to benefit 
distressed communities. This, of course, became the foundation for OZs.  
 With the idea developed, OZs found bipartisan support in Congress from Senators 
Tim Scott (R-South Carolina) and Cory Booker (D-New Jersey). Parker pitched the idea 
to other billionaires, including Steve Case and Jim Sorenson, and developed a powerful 
coalition to build support among legislators. By the end of 2016, there was extensive 
bipartisan support for a bill introduced by Scott and Booker in the Senate and its companion 
in the House carried by Pat Tiberi (R-Ohio) and Ron Kind (D-Wisconsin) (Bertoni, 2018). 
The Investing in Innovation Act (IIOA) was originally introduced in 2016 at the end of the 
Obama administration, but got caught up in Congress during the election. A year later, 
IIOA was attached to the major tax reform bill, which was not only politically contentious 
 32 
but also likely to pass because of Republican support in both chambers. Rather than move 
a standalone bill through a gridlocked legislature, Scott saw an opportunity to push OZs 
through by attaching it as a provision of the TCJA. OZs had support from top leadership in 
both the White House and Congress. Eventually the TCJA, including OZs, passed the 
House with a 227-205 vote and the Senate with a 51-49 vote. Thus, OZs were born. 
ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
 In today’s partisan political environment, bipartisanship is rare. What is it about 
OZs that garners bipartisan support? A free market solution that is economically attractive 
to wealth investors with the potential to move billions into distressed communities could 
be a win-win for all. OZs could offer several key benefits, including: 1) significant 
untapped private capital for distressed communities, 2) attractive and accessible tax 
benefits to investors, and 3) local flexibility to tailor projects and investments to 
community needs. 
• Untapped capital for distressed communities: Estimates from EIG indicate that there is 
over $6.1 trillion in unrealized corporate and individual capital gains (EIG, 2018a). 
Though no one expects the totality of those gains to be invested in OZs, even a fraction 
of that amount invested in low-income communities could jumpstart economic growth 
in a substantive way. As a comparison, the NMTC program has distributed $23 billion 
in tax credits since 2003 (Tax Policy Center). Between 1993 and 2009, the federal 
government authorized a total of $1.78 billion in grant funding for the EZ, EC, and RC 
programs (Congressional Research Service, 2011). Identifying the exact amount of tax 
incentives allocated towards the EZ/EC/RC programs is more difficult because of a 
lack of program data and accountability reporting; however, the GAO (2010) estimated 
allocations of over $600 million in bonds for large-scale construction in EZs, over $1.7 
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billion in tax deductions for rehabilitation projects in RCs, and $675 million in 
employment credits in EZs and RCs. The scale of potential investments in OZs is of a 
different magnitude than what has been available for previous federal economic 
development programs. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin believes that $100 billion 
in private capital investments is more likely in OZs (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
2018). For distressed communities, this level of investment could be significant enough 
to make inroads into entrenched social and economic challenges that held back the area 
for decades. Given the government’s decline in public investments, turning to private 
capital to fill the gap could offer a major win for distressed communities. 
• Attractive and accessible tax benefits for investors: One of the criticisms of past 
economic development programs was that they were too complicated and burdensome 
for investors. For example, the NMTC program required investors to make equity 
investments in CDEs, which received tax credits from the CDFI Fund and made 
separate investments in low-income communities. The administrative apparatus 
required to move private capital from investors to local communities and residents was 
clunky. Investors, who tend to be risk averse and unwilling to consider investing in 
low-income communities, could be turned off by the idea of navigating regulatory and 
bureaucratic hurdles. OZs removes many of those administrative burdens that 
characterized previous programs. Investors can invest in Opportunity Funds (OFs), 
which then make equity investments in OZs. 90% of an OF’s assets must be held within 
an OZ. The requirements for OFs are relatively simple compared to those of previous 
economic development programs, which were often criticized for being too clunky and 
complex for investors and fund managers. Table 3 shows the requirements of 
Opportunity Funds, as of spring 2019. 
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Table 3: Requirements of Opportunity Fund Structures. Source: Jacoby, 2019. 
The process to set up OFs is straightforward, requiring self-certification through a two-
page form from the IRS. Investors can invest and divest in OFs similar to how they 
might in non-OF investment funds. By investing in OFs and qualified OZ investments, 
private investors can unlock several significant tax benefits. Figure 1 highlights the key 
tax benefits associated with OZs.  
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Figure 1: Summary of Opportunity Zone Benefits. Compiled by author. 
The first tax benefit for investors is a temporary deferral of tax liability on capital gains 
from investments. Investors can delay paying taxes on capital gains from sold 
investments until 2026. Second, investors can reduce the amount of tax liability on 
deferred gains if they hold investments in OFs for a certain amount of time. At five 
years, investors receive a 10% step-up in basis on those original gains, reducing capital 
gains tax liability to 90% of the original value. At seven years, investors receive an 
additional 5% step-up so that they are only liable for tax on 85% of the original value 
of their deferred gains. For example, an investor with $100,000 in capital gains can 
defer paying taxes by investing in an OF. If the investor keeps his or her investment in 
the OF for five years, he or she is then liable for taxes only on $90,000. If he or she 
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holds the investment for seven years, then taxes only need to be paid on a $85,000 basis 
in 2026. If additional capital gains are generated by the investment in the OF, investors 
do not pay taxes on those gains if the investment is held for 10 years. All in all, these 
incentives can be significant for some investors, and the flexibility in setting up OFs 
ensures that they can more easily move their money into communities most in need. 
• Local flexibility to address community needs: Finally, OZs offer flexibility for 
investments and projects to be tailored to local needs. Investors, community 
development advocates, and local governments have the flexibility to structure their 
OZ strategies in many different ways. OFs can be set up for a variety of purposes 
ranging from specific geographic targets to specialization in types of projects 
supported. Community development advocates can pitch projects to investors that 
address important local needs. Municipal governments have flexibility to educate their 
residents on OZs, attract investors for different projects, and layer on additional 
incentives for development aligned to their priorities. Because there are few 
requirements at the federal level, there is a lot of flexibility for many different 
approaches to develop across OZ communities. Economically distressed areas differ in 
their needs and challenges. Simplified administration and fewer requirements allow for 
greater customization on the local and state level. This also built support for OZs among 
governors and mayors interested in taking advantage of this opportunity. 
POTENTIAL CHALLENGES & CONSEQUENCES OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
 Even with significant benefits and bipartisan support, OZs also have numerous 
challenges and potential consequences that may hinder the program’s ability to meet its 
policy goals. It is important to note that OZs are still unfolding, as the market is continuing 
to form and come into shape; however, for as much support as OZs garnered among 
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policymakers, it has raised significant concerns among community advocates and 
hesitancy from investors. Many fear that OZs are nothing more than a tax shelter for the 
wealthy. OZ incentives are designed to benefit investors, but not necessarily the 
communities that need the capital. To some extent, the challenges and criticisms of the OZ 
program are not unique. Many of these risks apply to previous economic development 
programs and strategies; however, calling attention to these challenges is important to 
ensuring that the government considers these issues in the early stages of OZ 
implementation. Primary criticisms of OZs include: 1) the potential for investments to flow 
to areas and projects that would already be funded, 2) risk of exacerbating gentrification or 
displacement, and 3) the lack of reporting requirements and accountability mechanisms.  
• Potential for investments to flow to areas and projects that would already be funded: 
Investors are motivated to seek investments with economic return, and the easiest way 
to ensure that their investments will result in profits is by going to areas that are already 
gentrifying. There is evidence to show that some states intentionally designated OZs 
where economic conditions were already improving or expected to gentrify (Gelfond 
& Looney, 2018). If the point is to direct investments towards the most economically 
distressed communities, then the OZ program is not narrow or specific enough in its 
mandate. The level of distress and need across 8700 OZs varies widely, and it behooves 
investors to put their money into areas already on the rise. A high-profile example of 
the flaw in OZ designation was Amazon’s proposed HQ2 in the Long Island City area 
of New York. Had Amazon decided to build its second headquarters there, the company 
could have set up an OF to purchase real estate for and around their proposed offices; 
however, the company indicated that it would choose not to seek OZ incentives for 
their proposed NYC HQ2 (Melby & Leatherby, 2019; see also, Tankersley, 2018; 
Melby, 2019). Other communities, particularly in attractive urban markets, designated 
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OZs that currently meet the poverty requirement of the program, but are already 
attractive to investors and developers due to factors such as proximity to urban centers, 
access to talent, and growing population. Because communities must compete with one 
another for investments, “superstar cities” such as Los Angeles and NYC will be pitted 
against smaller communities such as Cleveland and Rochester (Charles, 2019a). 
Naturally, investors will be motivated to move their money to larger cities, where they 
can expect their investments to grow and where there is less risk and uncertainty. So 
far, anecdotal evidence questions whether the OZ market is targeting the most 
economically distressed communities or if investors are drawn to areas that were 
already attractive (Grant, 2018; see also Hall, 2019).  
• Risk of exacerbating gentrification or displacement: If OZ investments are flowing to 
areas that are already improving, then additional private capital can facilitate more 
development that will attract higher income residents and displace low-income 
residents currently residing in the OZ. Evidence from past federal programs 
demonstrate that improvements in the economic conditions of distressed areas are often 
due to changes in the resident population, not improvements to the lives of low-income 
residents who resided in the area (Freeman, 2012; GAO, 2006). The same risk exists 
for OZs. The law and subsequent IRS regulations do not require any guardrails to 
protect current residents from displacement. While the program claims to be designed 
to benefit the nation’s most economically distressed communities, one of the main tax 
benefits for investors is “ultimately dependent on rising property values, rising rents, 
and higher business probability” (Looney, 2018).  To receive the full suite of tax 
benefits, investments made into OFs must appreciate in value, resulting in an exclusion 
from capital gains tax for investments held over 10 years. Investors benefit if their 
investments in OFs appreciate and generate additional capital gains; therefore, it is 
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economically more attractive to invest in areas where gentrification will likely occur 
(or is already underway). Though value creation in low-income communities is 
desirable, it comes with the risk of displacing residents and benefiting the wealthy. 
Adding requirements to preserve housing or employment for low-income residents 
could help mitigate the risk of displacement, but policymakers and regulators have not 
required investments to do so. 
• Lack of reporting requirements and accountability mechanisms: The GAO (2010) 
found that a lack of data collected about the EZ, EC, and RC programs hindered their 
ability to draw conclusions about the effectiveness and impact of those programs. 
Given this lesson, it is important for the IRS to mandate some kind of reporting 
requirement for investors and OFs to understand the types of investments made and 
benefits generated for the community. The problem is that, after two tranches of IRS 
regulations and guidance, there are no reporting requirements for OZ investors. OZs 
are meant to be simpler for investors than previous programs, but collecting no data 
about how much capital has been deployed, specific investments made, and outcomes 
from investments is a missed opportunity (Bloomberg Editorial Board, 2019a). There 
is no accountability mechanism to ensure that investments actually benefit 
communities. There is no way to know if the OZ program is effective unless the IRS 
requires funds to disclose information and report data on a regular basis. A group of 
impact-minded organizations jointly developed the Opportunity Zones Reporting 
Framework as a model for how fund managers should track and report on basic 
information such as fund demographics, transaction data, and community impact (U.S. 
Impact Investing Alliance, 2019).  Impact investors are encouraging the widespread 
adoption of the framework, but a voluntary, opt-in system of accountability is 
unacceptable.  Even after significant public comments and the introduction of the 
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framework, the IRS refused to develop any reporting requirements for the program. 
Currently, the IRS is seeking more public input on what kinds of data they should 
collect about the program, but investment deals in OZs are moving ahead in the 
meantime. From a government accountability standpoint, taxpayers should want to 
know, at the very least, if this program is effective and if it achieves the goals that it 
intends to do.  
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Chapter 4: Early Opportunity Zone Strategies for Texas Communities 
Communities across the country are thinking about OZs or devising strategies to 
attract investment and respond to investment interest. The focus of this chapter is on the 
role of local government in OZs. Without a formal role in the OZ program, local 
governments are in a position where they must respond to policies created at a federal level 
with significant impact on their jurisdictions and residents. Some communities are 
proactive in their approach to attract investors to their communities while others are in a 
reactive mode, only responding to inquiries that come to their attention.  
To better understand how different communities are developing their OZ strategies, 
I conducted interviews with local- and county-level economic development leaders across 
Texas. These individuals either worked in city government or at an economic development 
corporation, which are quasi-governmental organizations focused on promoting economic 
growth in a region. Interviews were conducted with a subset of communities in Texas to 
hold constant state-level policies and context for OZ development. This chapter highlights 
different strategies that these communities in Texas are taking in response to the federal 
OZ program. Findings are based on interviews with representatives across the following 
Texas cities: Austin, Brownsville, Dallas, Houston, Lubbock, Orange, San Antonio, 
Texarkana, and Tyler.  
TEXAS OPPORTUNITY ZONE DESIGNATION PROCESS 
 All governors were responsible for submitting nominations up to 25% of their 
eligible low-income communities to be designated as OZs by the Treasury/IRS. Governor 
Abbott designated 628 OZs across 145 counties in Texas with a large concentration in rural 
East Texas and areas that were impact by Hurricane Harvey. A map of Texas OZs can be 
found in Appendix C. The governors had flexibility to develop their own set of criteria and 
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processes for determining which areas of their state should be designated as OZs. In Texas, 
the governor’s office stated that they used a “multi-step process” that included 
consideration of an area’s unemployment rate, population, and “significant economic 
disruptors” such as Hurricane Harvey (Fechter, 2018). Overall, Governor Abbott chose to 
prioritize rural communities, with over 60% of Texas OZs in partially rural areas, and parts 
of the state recovering from hurricane disaster.   
Interviews with city officials across the state indicated that some (but not all) were 
invited to submit nominations of OZs to the governor’s office for submission. Some took 
this opportunity to nominate specific Census tracts aligned to their city’s broader economic 
development priorities. In most cases, the tracts submitted by cities were approved by the 
governor’s office; however, there were instances where the governor chose to designate 
tracts not submitted by cities, and other times when he chose not to approve tracts 
nominated by cities. For example, the City of Austin suggested four Census tracts for OZ 
designation to the governor based on the city’s priorities to develop healthy food options 
in the southeast portion of the city. Those tracts were approved by the governor’s office 
along with another 17 OZs across the city. Similar situations occurred in Brownsville and 
San Antonio, and it is unclear what rationale the governor’s office used to approve of tracts 
not submitted by cities or disapprove of tracts that were nominated. 
Not all cities nominated Census tracts to the governor’s office and instead found 
out about their OZs only after the governor submitted his preferences to the Treasury/IRS 
for final approval. Some cities did not realize that they could submit nominations to the 
governor’s office while others were less aware of the OZ program overall. Because of the 
variation in knowledge and involvement among cities during the nomination process, 
different communities responded to and developed strategies around the OZ program. 
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CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN URBAN VS. RURAL AREAS 
 As a market-driven incentive program, OZs only benefit low-income communities 
if investors find attractive deals and believe that the market can provide them with 
economic returns. There is no guarantee that designation as an OZ will lead to investments, 
and not all OZs are equal in their ability to attract investors. Some communities will 
naturally attract investors because they are poised for growth and have the physical 
infrastructure, talent pool, and economic incentives needed for profitable investments. 
Other communities may struggle to attract investors because their markets are less 
developed or perceived as riskier. Where a community falls along this continuum will 
determine what priorities and strategies they adopt to capitalize on OZ benefits for their 
residents and businesses. 
 For large, urban communities, investments may flow more easily. Investors and 
developers tend to gravitate towards these larger communities that are more likely to 
generate economic return. People are moving to cities and their surrounding suburbs for 
jobs and other opportunities. Between 2017 and 2018, the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan 
grew at a rate faster than any other area in the United States (Ura, 2019). Texas is home to 
six of the top 20 largest cities in the country, and many of these cities regularly top lists of 
the fastest growing communities across the nation (Rosenberg, 2018). Texas cities, in 
particular, are attractive markets for investors who want to take advantage of a business-
friendly climate and developers who want to meet resident demands for housing and other 
real estate needs. The state consistently ranks in the top five states to do business due to its 
a lack of an individual income tax and corporate tax well as generous tax incentives from 
local and state governments (Cohn, 2018). Under Governor Rick Perry, Texas offered $19 
billion in incentives to businesses each year, more than any other state in the country (Story, 
2012). This does not mean that economic growth has benefitted all residents equally, as 
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there are still many communities with disproportionate and entrenched social and economic 
challenges. Overall, the largest metropolitan areas in Texas are growing and continue to 
attract investments, development, and new residents every day. OZ incentives could 
sweeten the deals for investors already looking to move into these urban markets.  
 While urban communities are poised for further growth under the OZ program, 
small and/or rural communities may have more difficulty leveraging OZ incentives, 
especially without proactive efforts from municipal leaders to attract investors. Nationally, 
over 40% of OZs are rural communities, but OZ observers believe that it will take more 
than the tax incentives to move private capital into distressed areas with deep-seated social 
and economic challenges (Farmer, 2019). Since the Great Recession, economic recovery 
in rural and small communities lagged behind that of larger urban centers. Efforts to 
revitalize small communities ranging from direct public investments to tax incentives vary 
in their effectiveness; however, some believe that employment-focused incentives may 
generate the most positive social and economic benefits (Austin et al., 2018). Tax 
incentives alone are often not enough to draw risk-averse investors to smaller, rural 
communities (Peters & Fisher, 2004). Investors look for low-risk, high-return investment 
opportunities; therefore, investments in rural communities may not be as attractive when 
compared to the potential return offered by investments in larger urban markets.  Over 60% 
of Texas’ OZs are partially or fully rural; therefore, municipal governments in rural areas 
or the state government will need to step in with additional incentives to ensure that capital 
reaches rural communities in need. 
STRATEGIES FOR LARGE, URBAN COMMUNITIES  
 Interviews with city officials in large communities across Texas indicate that cities 
not only benefit from investor attraction but also resources to develop strategies around 
 45 
development in their OZs. Larger cities have in-house economic development staff that can 
develop knowledge and expertise about OZs. Even in the absence of a city economic 
development department, large cities also benefit from a network of investors, developers, 
community development corporations (CDCs), and others who are aware of and working 
on OZ issues. For example, the Coasis Coalition based in Dallas is a broad, cross-sector 
group of investors, developers, fund managers, businesses, and public institutions 
interested in OZs. The coalition hosted a conference in April 2019, attracting people 
interested in OZs from across the country. Having this level of expertise in one’s backyard 
is a huge boon to large, urban cities. Other approaches taken by Texas cities include: 
• Convening and aligning internal and external stakeholders: Several Texas cities, most 
notably San Antonio and Houston, have taken the lead in convening stakeholders across 
city departments as well as cross-sector working groups to develop OZ strategies that 
work for both investors and communities. The City of San Antonio is currently 
convening two key groups: 1) a technical working group with representatives across 
nine different city departments, and 2) an external advisory group with CDCs, 
redevelopment authorities, investors, developers, and tax attorneys. The purpose of 
these groups is to help city economic development staff build expertise around OZs, 
facilitate coordination of city processes around developments in OZs, and create a 
forum for investors and communities to communicate their needs and goals for OZ 
projects. The City of Houston adopted a similar approach by convening over 80 
stakeholders for a forum on OZs, which led to the creation of a cross-sector working 
group that meets weekly to develop a citywide OZ strategy. This working group now 
has subcommittees focused on marketing high-priority projects to potential OFs and 
investors as well as engaging landowners and business owners currently in OZs. By 
convening advisory and working groups, cities can build relationships with different 
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stakeholders who have an interest in OZs. An additional benefit to convening a broad 
group of stakeholders is that economic development staff can become more aware of 
OF investments in their city. Officials across multiple cities stated that they did not 
have a formal process to track and monitor OF investments in their cities. Because not 
all development deals flow through the economic development department, officials 
only become aware of OF deals that proactively come to their office for additional 
incentives or support. Others learn of OF deals from colleagues in other departments 
who manage other aspects of city development such as zoning or permitting. One city 
official learned of an OF investment by attending an event on OZs where a panelist 
spoke of a deal in their city. By convening broad stakeholder groups, cities can not only 
collaborate on citywide OZ strategies but also stay abreast of OZ activity among 
investors and others. City staff become more aware about the latest information on 
OZs, deals occurring in their cities, and ways to further incentive investments that 
support city priorities.  
• Layering local and state incentives for OZ projects aligned to city priorities: Cities that 
naturally generate investor interest have more leeway to offer additional layers of 
incentives for projects in high-need communities or for development that is wanted by 
community stakeholders. A risk with the OZ program is that investors can completely 
bypass community engagement to build projects that may not address community 
needs. Because larger communities are not necessarily starved for investment overall, 
cities have some level of flexibility around adding incentives to help direct OZ 
investments towards community priorities. The City of San Antonio is also working to 
expedite zoning and permitting processes for projects that are aligned to the city’s long-
term strategic plan or located near 13 regional economic development centers 
prioritized for development. For larger cities, the challenge is not attracting 
 47 
investments, but instead guiding investments towards city priorities. Offering 
additional incentives and support from city staff for high-priority projects is one way 
that larger communities can sweeten the deal for investors while also addressing 
community needs. 
• Developing an investment prospectus to attract investors for high-priority OZs: 
Accelerator for America, an organization founded by Los Angeles Mayor Garcetti, 
focuses on innovative economic development strategies at the local level. They 
developed and championed an OZ Investment Prospectus guide to support cities 
“communicate the distinctive assets and advantages of their selected Opportunity 
Zones and, to the greatest extent practicable, tease out specific investable projects and 
propositions” (Katz et al). The City of Houston released an investment prospectus in 
May 2019 highlighting the city’s investment priorities in affordable housing, retail 
development/food deserts, manufacturing, tech innovation, and community 
development (City of Houston, 2019). A few other city officials indicated that they 
would also like to develop a formal investment prospectus in the near future. Thus far, 
Dallas and San Antonio have prepared various communications tools, including one-
pagers and PowerPoint presentations on the types of investments and development that 
they hope to see in their OZs. Developing an investment prospectus provides cities with 
a proactive way to attract investors to projects vetted by the city and community.  
• Providing OZ information to interested stakeholders: Finally, several Texas cities, 
including Austin, Dallas, and Brownsville, currently conceive of the city’s role as an 
informational source for investors, community members, and others interested in OZs. 
The Austin City Council passed a resolution in October 2018 directing the city’s 
economic development staff to research the city’s OZs, identify best practices from 
other city governments, and highlight any additional incentives that may be used to 
 48 
guide OZ investments in Austin. Dallas has provided general information on the OZ 
program through its website, mapping tools, and briefings to their city. To some extent, 
all city economic development departments are taking an educational approach to OZs 
by providing data on their OZs, keeping track of changes in the IRS’ guidance and 
regulations, and fielding calls from interested parties about the OZ program. This 
informational function can be useful to both community members and investors who 
may be less familiar about the city’s OZs or how the OZ program may impact 
communities overall.  
STRATEGIES FOR SMALL, RURAL COMMUNITIES  
 While larger, urban cities in Texas have adopted a variety of early approaches to 
developing their OZ strategies, smaller, rural areas in Texas have seen little to no activity 
in their OZs. This is not because there is a lack of interest in making OZs work for smaller, 
rural areas of the state. As discussed in earlier sections of this report, rural communities 
across the country face greater barriers to attracting investments in their OZs, which are 
less able to generate the kinds of economic returns that investors are seeking. 
Representatives from smaller communities in Texas, including Texarkana, Tyler, Orange, 
and Lubbock indicated that they were not aware of any investment activity in their OZs, 
and some questioned whether they would be able to attract OZ investors at all. Several 
economic development officials in these cities indicated that they have to weigh the costs 
of committing staff resources towards understanding OZs and attracting investors with the 
potential (but not guaranteed) benefit of additional investments. Given more limited 
resources and fewer staff dedicated to economic development, staying up-to-date on OZs 
and finding investors can be a burdensome task for smaller communities.   
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 Unlike large city government, smaller communities may not have municipal staff 
dedicated to working on economic development issues. In these communities, economic 
development corporations (EDCs) can play an important role in facilitating projects and 
finding investors, but even then, the EDCs tend to be small and understaffed. Given the 
legal and tax complexities of the OZ program, having technical assistance and resources to 
parse through information about OZs and how they can work in smaller communities is 
invaluable. One interviewee stated that figuring out how to make OZs work for small and 
rural communities would require hiring an additional full-time staff person to work only 
on OZs. While this is possible for a large city government with an entire economic 
development department, smaller communities need additional support to understand the 
technical underpinnings of the OZ program. To some extent, all communities, whether 
large or small, have had difficulties understanding how OZs would be implemented 
because of a lack of clarity in regulations from the IRS; however, larger cities have the 
resources to dedicate some staff time towards understanding their OZs and how the 
program may or may not benefit their communities. The economic development 
infrastructure in smaller communities is less extensive and more under-resourced. 
 Many small communities in Texas have assets that could be attractive to businesses 
and have priorities where development could significantly benefit their residents. For 
example, former military property in Texarkana is available to private investors and 
developers for redevelopment. There are thousands of acres of land available, and 
significant resources have gone to building industrial-grade water, electricity, and 
technological infrastructure over the last several decades. The community in Orange has 
identified a need for healthcare facilities that could benefit from OZ investments. Many of 
these areas have mayors and city councils that support OZs and want to see investments 
benefitting their communities. Most of these communities have an EDC that can help 
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facilitate development projects. The issue is not whether there are assets and potential 
projects in small and rural communities. The true challenge is figuring out how to attract 
investors in these distressed areas, making it economically viable and profitable for them 
to move their money into communities that are traditionally overlooked. 
 One way to attract investors to small, rural areas is by offering state-level incentives 
for rural investments. For example, West Virginia is considering an income tax exemption 
for OZ investments, Maryland is proposed a tax credit for OZ businesses that hire formerly 
incarcerate individuals, and Florida is overlapping OZs with their state enterprise zones to 
maximize benefits for investors (Charles, 2019b). Several bills in the 86th Texas legislature 
are proposing different state OZ incentives ranging from tax refunds for OZ businesses to 
offering tax credits to investors who invest in rural OFs and OZs. HB 1000 introduced by 
Representative Paddie proposes $35 million in tax credits against state insurance tax 
liability for investors who invest in rural funds and OZs (House Research Organization, 
2019). The tax credits would be administered by the Texas Economic Development and 
Tourism Office (TEDTO), which would allocate credits through a competitive application 
process requiring investors to show investment activity and the number of jobs created 
through an OZ investment. Those receiving tax credits must submit an annual report about 
their investments and community impact to TEDTO. HB 1000 passed out of the Texas 
House of Representatives on April 16, 2019 with a 113-19 vote. At the time of the writing 
of this report, the bill has been sent to the Texas Senate and referred to the Senate Business 
and Commerce committee. If this bill passes before the end of the legislative session, it 
could incentivize investors to turn towards smaller, rural communities and make rural 
investment opportunities more economically attractive.  
 Finally, other states with disproportionately high rural OZ designations have 
generated interest in rural investments through OFs set up with the specific goal of 
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targeting rural communities. The Rural COZ Fund in Colorado is an OF created to develop 
real estate projects in the state’s rural OZs (Four Points Funding, 2019). Creating OFs with 
a targeted goal of investing in rural OZs is one way that investors and fund managers can 
move private capital into rural distressed areas. Many OFs are designed to support specific 
geographic targets or types of development projects. Investments in rural communities will 
likely not flow on their own. Instead, it may take state-level intervention to make rural 
investments more attractive, proactive efforts to attract investors to these areas, and focus 
from fund managers to support the needs of small, rural communities.  
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Conclusion 
Since the passage of the TCJA in 2017, Opportunity Zones have generated a lot of 
buzz and interest from investors, real estate developers, economic development 
corporations, and community development organizations. As the first federal economic 
development program in decades, Opportunity Zones could generate billions in much 
needed investments for low-income communities. Unlocking private capital to benefit 
distressed urban and rural areas can foster economic growth, create jobs, and revitalize 
communities across the country.  
Eighteen months into the program, Opportunity Zones continue to attract attention 
and debate within the economic development field; however, while interest may be high, 
the amount of investments made in low-income communities has been limited. This is due 
in part to delays in the release of regulations and guidance from the IRS, which administers 
the program. The National Council of State Housing Agencies (NCSHA)’ Opportunity 
Fund Directory, which is an opt-in database, currently has over 100 listed funds totally 
almost $24 billion in potential investments. While many Opportunity Funds have been 
created, fewer dollars have made their way to communities. The first Opportunity Zone 
deal closed in Texas is a $16 million real estate development to construct a climate-
controlled, self-storage building in San Antonio (Fechter, 2019). Investments in other cities 
included development of a luxury, multi-family apartment building in downtown Houston 
and continued interest in other real estate projects across the state’s largest cities (Smith, 
2019). Though interest is high, uptake has been slow. Some believe that investors want 
more clarity from the federal government before they jump in while others are unsure if 
tying their money up in long-term, potentially risky investments is worth the benefit 
(Browning, 2019). With a newly released second tranche of guidance from the IRS, some 
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expect more investors to jump into the market over the coming months, especially because 
investments in OFs need to be made by the end of 2019 to qualify for the full suite of tax 
benefits (Rubin, 2019). If the assumption that a lack of clarity in federal guidelines kept 
investors at bay, then the additional set of regulations released in April 2019 could motivate 
more investors to seek OZ deals. 
One of the biggest challenges of the Opportunity Zone program is the tight timeline 
for investors to unlock maximum benefits of the program. For those who wish to receive 
all of the program’s tax benefits, their capital gains must be invested in an Opportunity 
Fund by the end of 2019. Those funds must make investments in Opportunity Zone projects 
within six months. Given continued lack of clarity in IRS guidance and the quick 
turnaround needed to move an investor’s money into a qualified Opportunity Fund, 
expectations of significant investment in communities may be overstated. Investors will 
look for “shovel-ready projects” (mostly real estate development) where they can 
immediately put their money to receive tax benefits (Banister, 2018). Some of these 
projects may be beneficial to communities and their residents, but there is no guarantee 
that Opportunity Zone investments will go towards projects that communities want and 
need to improve the lives of their residents.  
Based on evidence of past federal programs and trends in how Opportunity Zones 
have emerged thus far, the biggest lingering question is: who will benefit from Opportunity 
Zones? Clearly this is a program intended to benefit private investors, but the potential for 
community impact is less clear. Some critics of the program believe that the Census tracts 
designated as Opportunity Zones are not home to the country’s most distressed 
communities, though the average poverty level and unemployment rate in these zones are 
higher than national averages (Jacoby, 2019). Many are concerned that the program is 
designed to offer investors flexibility in their investments, but is not strict enough in 
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ensuring that investments result in tangible social and economic benefits to Opportunity 
Zone residents (Bloomberg Editorial Board, 2019a). One of the key challenges of past 
federal economic development programs was the level of complexity in program structure 
and burdensome requirements on investors (Bernstein & Hassett, 2015). In trying to reduce 
program bureaucracy and complexity, the Opportunity Zones program may have swung 
too far, as one of the chief criticisms of the program is the lack of requirements ensuring 
that investments deliver community benefits (Jacoby, 2019; see also Bloomberg Editorial 
Board, 2019b; Cornett, 2019). At the time of this report, investors and fund managers will 
not be required to provide any data about specific investment projects, jobs created, or 
other community benefits. 
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates the cost of the Opportunity Zone 
program will be $1.6 billion through 2027 (Buhayar, 2019). Given the hefty price tag, 
taxpayers deserve to know if this program will achieve its goals of revitalizing distressed 
communities. Many interest groups advocated to the Department of Treasury after the first 
tranche of regulations was released in October 2018 that, at a minimum, the department 
needs to collect basic information about Opportunity Fund investments such as projects 
supported, the amount of funding for each project, and where projects are located 
(Bloomberg Editorial Board, 2019b). Impact-minded investors even created a framework 
for transparency and accountability that would provide the public, policymakers, and future 
researchers with information needed to understand the true impact of Opportunity Zones 
(Seegull, 2018). Yet, no reporting requirements were mandated in the second tranche of 
regulations released by the IRS in April 2019. Meanwhile, investors and fund managers 
are seeking to invest in Opportunity Funds by the end of the year. Without this information, 
we may not be able to evaluate whether the Opportunity Zone program fulfills its original 
promise and whether or not this is an effective, efficient use of limited resources. 
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Moving forward, there are a few ways that local, state, and federal governments 
can improve the Opportunity Zone program so that it is more likely to result in community 
development. First, the IRS should take note of public comments advocating for additional 
reporting requirements and program transparency. There is already support in Congress for 
additional accountability measures. Senators Tim Scott and Cory Booker, the original 
supporters for Opportunity Zones, filed a bill in May 2019 that would require Treasury to 
collect additional information on Opportunity Fund investments, including fund holdings, 
job creation, poverty reduction, and growth of new businesses (O’Neal, 2019). This 
legislation could be strengthened by directly requiring an evaluation of the program at 
different milestones of the program and at the end of the program in 2026 or 2027.  
Second, state governments can create additional incentive programs to attract 
investors to the highest need communities. One example is HB1000 in the 86th Texas 
legislature. Creating state-level incentives making investments in small-town, rural, or 
highly distressed urban communities more attractive to investors can help move capital 
toward areas that need it most. In the absence of federal reporting requirements, states can 
pass legislation requiring data transparency and accountability for investors seeking to 
invest in their state. Finally, local governments can influence investments in their 
Opportunity Zones in a variety of ways, including layering local incentives, collecting data 
on Opportunity Fund investments, and working with investors and fund managers to 
identify projects that deliver both economic return and community impact.  
 In conclusion, Opportunity Zones are significant and worthy of attention as the 
most recent, large-scale economic development effort in the U.S. in over a decade. 
Designed to incentivize private investors to invest in economically distressed communities, 
the program has significant potential to catalyze economic growth across the country. No 
program is perfect, and the devil is often in the details. The government can improve the 
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likelihood of success by adding reporting requirements to the program and further 
incentivizing investments in the highest-need Opportunity Zones. Looking to past federal 
economic development policies for lessons about data collection and program structures 
can help inform improvements to the Opportunity Zone program and address potential 
shortcomings at an early stage of program implementation. 
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Appendix A: Map of EZs, ECs, and RCs 
 
 
 
Source: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 
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Appendix B: Map of Opportunity Zones 
 
 
Source: Economic Innovation Group, 2018b. 
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Appendix C: Map of Opportunity Zones in Texas 
 
 
Source: Perlmeter, 2018. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
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